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Incident management

Well-designed incident management systems assist patients, carers, families and the workforce to identify, report, manage and learn from incidents.

An incident is an event or circumstance that resulted, or could have resulted, in unintended or unnecessary harm to a patient or consumer; or a complaint, loss or damage.

In Australia, hospital patient safety incidents are captured through local incident management systems. There are well established and effective process for data analysis and investigations.
 

Incident management guide

The guide provides a brief overview of the incident management process and best practice approaches. It complements state and territory incident management policies, which provide more detailed information on local systems. Links to these policies are included in the guide.

View the guide
 

Patient safety investigation methodologies

All incidents with the highest severity rating should undergo an in-depth investigation. There are a range of investigation methodologies used, the most common are:

  • Root Cause Analysis
  • London Protocol
  • Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.

For review of low severity incidents and near misses, less resource intensive tools are used, for example, After-Action Review, Debriefing and Hudd es, and Swarm.

Each organisation or jurisdiction should have policies and procedures to determine when different types of investigation are appropriate.

Root Cause Analysis

Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is a systematic process that attempts to answer three questions about an incident:

  • What happened?
  • Why did it happen?
  • How can we prevent it happening again?

RCA brings together a small team of diverse set of individuals who are independent to the incident.

RCA represents a toolbox of approaches rather than a single method. More than 40 RCA techniques are described in literature, including brainstorming, cause-effect charts, ‘five whys’ diagrams and fault trees. Regardless of these variations, RCAs are organised in sequential steps. The end point of an RCA is a set of recommendations for an organisation to implement to reduce harm to patients in the future.

Aggregating findings from multiple RCAs, other incident investigations and other data sources can be used to identify future risks and proactively develop improvement programs.

Key steps

Team should be diverse and representative. Team members should not have been involved in the incident.

  • Aim: to develop a chronological map of what is known and the gaps in knowledge of the incident.
  • Method: document review and develop questions based on a guide.
  • Aim: to complete the gaps in knowledge.
  • Method: interviews, document review, literature review, observation, testing or any other method as appropriate.
  • Aim: to develop a high level complete chronological map of the key facts of the incident.
  • Method: collation and synthesis of gathered information.
  • Aim: to systematically list the contributing factors that lead to the incident.
  • Method: collation and synthesis of gathered information using the final flow diagram to guide.
  • Aim: to organise the contributing factors identified in the brainstorming and to develop root causes.
  • Method: collation of contributing factors using a diagrammatic representation.
  • Aim: to organise the contributing factors in the cause and effect diagram.
  • Method: collation of contributing factors using a structured text-based representation.
  • Aim: to develop interventions to prevent a re-occurrence of the incident.
  • Method: brainstorm and prioritise organisational actions that impact on the root causes.
  • Aim: to ensure interventions are implemented and the effectiveness of interventions are monitored.
  • Method: develop action plan for implementation with tasks and responsibility clearly assigned. Use quality improvement methodologies such as Plan-Do-Study-Act cycle for implementation.
     
  • Hagley G, Mills PD, Watts BV, Wu AW. Review of alternatives to root cause analysis: developing a robust system for incident report analysis. BMC Open Quality. 2019 Aug 1;8(3):e000646.
  • National Patient Safety Foundation. RCA2 - Improving Root Cause Analyses and Actions to Prevent Harm. Boston: NPSF, 2015.
  • Nicolini D, Waring j, Mengis j. The challenges of undertaking root cause analysis in health care: a qualitative study. journal of Health Services Research & Policy. 2011;16 Suppl 1:34-41.

London Protocol

The London Protocol takes a systems approach to incident investigation. It provides a structure for interviews and the search for information. The interview questions focus on the chronology of the incident, care delivery problems and contributory factors.

Problems that happen during the process of care, usually actions or omissions by members of staff. An incident can have several care delivery problems. Care delivery problems have two essential features:

  • Care deviated beyond safe limits of practice
  • The deviation had at least a potential direct or indirect effect on the eventual adverse outcome for the patient, staff or general public.

Many factors may contribute to a care delivery problem. The London Protocol provides a framework to classify and examines these factors which includes:

  • Patient factors
  • Task and technology factors
  • Individual (staff) factors
  • Team factors
  • Work environmental factors
  • Organisational and management factors
  • Institutional context factors.

Key steps

Team should be diverse and representative. Team members should not have been involved in the incident.

  • Aim: to gather all known facts about the incident.
  • Method: Interviews, document review, literature review, observation, testing or any other method as appropriate.
  • Aim: to develop a high level complete chronological map of the key facts of the incident.
  • Method: Collation and synthesis of gathered information using either chronological narratives, timelines, time person grids, or flow charts.
  • Aim: to systematically list the CDPs that lead to the incident. CDPs are usually actions or omissions by staff in the process of care. For example, failure to monitor a patient.
  • Method: collation and synthesis of gathered information and brainstorming.
  • Aim: to identify and organise the contributing factors for each CDP.
  • Method: collation of contributing factors using a diagrammatic representation.
  • Aim: to develop interventions to tackle the system's weaknesses.
  • Method: brainstorm and prioritise organisational actions that impact on the contributory factors.
  • Taylor-Adams S, Vincent C. Systems Analysis of Clinical incidents: The London Protocol. London: Imperial College, London, 2004.

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic method of identifying clinical problems before they occur. FMEA does not rely on something going wrong as the trigger for an investigation.

It involves proactive hazard analysis and identifying actions to mitigate the risks. The key questions considered during hazard analysis include:

  • What could go wrong?
  • Why would the failure happen?
  • What would be the consequence of each failure?

FMEA is used for:

  • Evaluating a new process prior to implementation
  • Assessing the impact of a proposed change to an existing process
  • System redesign of high-priority processes where the consequence of failure can be high (for example, radiotherapy or blood transfusion).

Barriers for using FMEA

FMEA is time consuming and resource intensive. On average one FMEA requires six to eight meetings of 1.5 hours duration with around eight participants.

Topics should be well-defined and scoped and there should be reasonable certainty that they are high risk if an investment in FMEA is to be undertaken.

Key steps in a FMEA

New process prior to implementation OR assessing the impact of a proposed change to an existing process OR an identified high risk process.

  • Aim: to develop a chronological map of what is known and the gaps in knowledge of the incident.
  • Method: document review and develop questions based on a guide.
  • Aim: identification of all the steps involved in delivering care and gaining a clear picture of the way a specific health service is organised, operated or delivered.
  • Method: Process Mapping- using flow diagrams to create a detailed map of all the processes and sub-processes involved. Use brainstorming, iterations and consensus.
  • Aim: to list all possible/potential failure modes for each process step.
  • Method: use triggering questions, brainstorming, cause and effect diagramming to identify potential failure modes.

Note:

  • Failure Mode — different ways that a process or sub-process can fail to provide the anticipated result (What could go wrong?).
  • Failure Cause — different reasons as to why a process or sub-process would fail to provide the anticipated result (Why would the failure happen?).
  • Failure Effect - varying results of the failure mode (What would be the consequences of each failure?).
  • Aim: to assign a numeric score for likelihood of occurrence, likelihood of detection, and severity to each failure mode.
  • Method: brainstorming and use of templates such as severity assessment codes.
  • Aim: determine an action for each failure mode.
  • Method: brainstorm actions to ‘eliminate’, ’control’, or ‘accept’ the failure mode cause and prioritise these according to risk scores.
  • See Institute for Healthcare Improvement or the Department of Veterans Affairs National Center for Patient Safety documents.

Last updated: 16 November 2026